



























Center for Operations Research 
and Econometrics 
 





 CORE DISCUSSION PAPER   
2010/38 
 
Myopia, redistribution and pensions 
 








This  paper  reviews  a  number  of  recent  contributions  that  study  pension  design  with  myopic 
individuals. Its objective is to explore how the presence of more or less myopic individuals affects 
pension design when individuals differ also in productivity. This double heterogeneity gives rise 
to an interesting interplay between paternalistic and redistributive considerations, which is at the 
heart of most of the results that are presented. The main part of the paper is devoted to the issue of 
pension design when myopic individual do not save “enough” for their retirement because their 
“myopic self” (with a high discount rate) emerges when labor supply and savings decisions are 
made. Some extensions and variations are considered in the second part. In particular we deal 
with  situations  where  labor  disutility  or  preferences  for  consumption  are  subject  to  “habit 
formation”  and  where  sin  goods  have  a  detrimental  effect  on  second  period  health.  Myopic 
individuals tend to underestimate the effects of both habit formation and sinful consumption, 
which complicates public policy. 
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Myopia and redistribution are probably two of the most convincing rationales for the
existence of social security systems.1 Myopic individuals may not save enough given
their life expectancy, and public pensions force them to save an appropriate amount.
In most countries, public pension systems also contribute to redistributing resources.
The standard approach in the literature treats these two functions separately, and the
underlying issues are by now well understood. Treating them together is less easy! The
interplay between myopia and redistribution leads to a number of diﬃculties that have
been dealt with in the literature surveyed here.
Not everyone agrees with these two rationales. Concerning the redistributive func-
tion, the question is whether one needs social security to ensure a better income dis-
tribution. Why not instead just redistribute incomes at the start of lifetime and let
people save what they want? This objection, though at ﬁrst sight well taken, neglects
a real world fact: societies are more willing to redistribute resources in old age than in
earlier stages of life.2 The paternalistic notion of “forced saving” argument was often
rejected because it rested on diﬀerences in discount rates between citizens and govern-
ments. More precisely, governments were assumed to be more future-oriented and more
patient than their citizens. A more modern view of paternalistic forced saving rests on
a gap between individuals’ long-run goals and their short-run behavior.3 This position
appears to be more widely accepted.
Recent empirical research has underlined various inadequacies of the standard dis-
counted utility model as a descriptive representation of behavior. In particular, it
appears that discount rates are not invariant over diﬀerent horizons. Indeed, as already
noted by Strotz (1956), agents appear to discount the future relative to the present
more rapidly than they discount between diﬀerent dates in the future. According to
1In this survey the terms “public pensions” and “social security” are used indiﬀerently to designate
the retirement branch of social insurance.
2In any event the underlying theoretical issue, namely that optimal age-related taxation has not been
solved yet.
3In Pestieau and Possen (2008) public pensions are desirable not only because of myopia, but also
because of “prodigality”. This phenomenon induces middle income individuals not to save at all,
knowing that they will be bailed out in the old age by a “Good Samaritan” government.
1this hypothesis, people are impatient at present, but claim to be patient in the future.
To understand the consequences of this type of preferences, Laibson (1997) adopted a
discrete time discount function.4 With these so-called hyperbolic preferences, events
in the near future are discounted at a higher discount rate than events in the distant
future. Put diﬀerently, hyperbolic preferences are time-inconsistent, in the sense that
preferences at time t are inconsistent with preferences at time t+1. As a consequence,
hyperbolic agents report a gap between their long-run goals and their short-run behav-
ior. This has important implications for their economic choices and leads to phenomena
like procrastination and undersaving.
This gap between long-run and short-run preferences leads to the important con-
ceptual question of whether the government should give priority to the long-run time
preferences, at the expenses of instant tastes. In other words, should the present in-
dividual’s choices be corrected to make them time consistent. In this survey we adopt
the view that the government should paternalistically give priority to long term con-
cerns.5 So doing we are aware that the direct relation between market equilibrium and
social welfare optimum becomes blurred. Let us repeat that the discrepancy between
government’s and individuals’ preferences is not due to diﬀerences in discount rates
(future-oriented governments imposing their view on citizens seeking instant gratiﬁca-
tion). This is what can be called the “old paternalism” in the line of Musgrave’s merit
goods. With hyperbolic preferences individuals will ex post be grateful to the govern-
ment for having forced them to act according to their long-run concerns. This is what
is now called the “new paternalism”.
To keep the presentation of ideas and work as clear as possible we had to restrict the
scope of this survey in two main directions.6 First, we adopt a two-period model: in the
ﬁrst period, individuals work and save part of their earnings for their consumption in
retirement and retire in the second. So doing, we do not use hyperbolic preferences per
se but we keep the spirit of the concept that is the duality of selves towards saving. The
4This speciﬁcation was ﬁrst introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968) to study intergenerational time
preferences.
5For an excellent discussion, see Diamond (2003) and Kaplow (2006).
6See Findley and Caliendo (2008) for a survey focusing on the behavioral justiﬁcation for public
pensions.
2pioneering contribution using this two period speciﬁcation is due to Feldstein (1985).7
To have genuine hyperbolic preferences, one needs at least three periods as in Frogneux
(2009) or Diamond and Koszegi (2000). Second, we assume that the retirement age is
given. In other words we do not consider the retirement decision unlike Diamond and
Koszegi (2000), Frogneux (2009) and Bassi (2008). These two limits allow us to focus
on the double heterogeneity (myopia and productivity) which otherwise brings about a
drastic increase in the degree of complexity.8
We use the same model throughout the survey: a two-period static model with
work in the ﬁrst period and retirement in the second.9 The technology is linear so
that both interest and wage rates are given. Individuals save part of their earnings
for their consumption in retirement. They diﬀer in productivity and in their degree of
myopia. Myopic individuals may not save “enough” for their retirement because their
“myopic self” emerges when labor supply and savings decisions are made. In other
words, they use a discount factor which does not reﬂect their “true” time preferences.
When they retire, they regret their earlier decisions. Consequently, they would be in
favor of an imposed commitment forcing them to save a certain amount. We distinguish
between two settings: a normative one and a positive one. In the normative setting, the
paternalistic government helps the individuals to overcome their myopia problem. In
measuring social welfare it uses the rate of time preference of the far-sighted individuals
(whose myopic self never emerges). Ex post, myopic individuals will be grateful to
the government for such forced saving. In the positive setting, individuals vote at the
start of the ﬁrst period. At that point, the myopics vote for an imposed commitment
knowing that as soon as out of the voting booth they will relapse in their need for
instant gratiﬁcation. In other words, they behave as sophisticated and not as naive
myopic agents. Note that this normative rule can be given a positive interpretation.
Behind the veil of ignorance concerning ability and myopia, expected utility maximizing
7Feldstein assumes that individual do not just use to low a discount factor assumes but that they
also underestimate the level of their future pension beneﬁts. See also Docquier (2002).
8We do not mention a number of studies (e.g., Gustman and Steinmeier(2001) and Frogneux (2009).)
showing that misperception can also arise when the information required to make plans for the future
is not widely available among the population.
9Our assumptions and their implications are discussed in the Conclusion.
3individuals would unanimously vote for such a rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we study a social
security program with a proportional payroll tax rate and a linear beneﬁtf o r m u l a .
Beneﬁts are a weighted average of a ﬂat and a contributive component according to
a parameter which determines the degree of redistributiveness of the system. We ﬁrst
determine the optimal policy and then study a voting procedure. In either case, both the
generosity and the degree of redistribution are chosen. Then in section 3, we consider
the case of a non linear scheme. Section 4 is devoted to a number of extensions in which
myopia interfere with habit formation, sinful consumption and overwork.10
2 Linear pension scheme
2.1 Myopic and far—sighted individuals: laissez-faire and ﬁrst-best
Individuals’ utility is given by
U(ci,d i,  i)=V (ci,  i)+βu(di), (1)
where ci and di are ﬁrst- and second-period consumption while  i is labor supplied
in the ﬁrst period. Gross earnings are given by yi = wi i and are obtained in the ﬁrst
period. Individuals diﬀer in their wage rate, wi. Individuals can save part of ﬁrst period
income at a zero interest rate. To keep the analysis simple we often focus on the case
where liquidity constraints are not binding.11 However, the expressions for the optimal
pension parameters are valid with and without liquidity constraints.
For all individuals the “true” time-discount factor is given by β. However not all
individuals will make their labor supply and consumption decisions according to this
parameter. For some individuals, their “myopic self” emerges when labor supply and
saving are chosen. They take all decisions according to a time discount parameter
β0 <β . Formally, savings and labor supply are chosen according to
Ui(ci,d i,  i)=V (ci,  i)+βiu(di). (2)
10The backbone of this survey rests on our own work and that of coauthors. However, a number of
other recent contributions are also mentioned and positioned with respect to our canonical model.
11When the pension system is generous poor individuals may want to borrow against future beneﬁts
and thus unsave. Introducing liquidity constraints would prevent them from doing so.
4For myopic individuals we have βi = β0, while βi = β holds for the far-sighted. We
adopt two alternative speciﬁcations for V (ci,  i). In the linear case, both normative and
positive, we use
V (ci,  i)=u(xi)=u(ci − v( i)),
with u being strictly concave and v strictly convex. In the non linear case, we have
instead:
V (ci,  i)=u(ci) − v( i).
The quasi linear speciﬁcation allows to assume away income eﬀects. The second speciﬁ-
cation that assumes additivity is consistent with Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and their
proposition of zero taxation of saving.
We take a paternalistic approach and consider the utilitarian ﬁrst-best optimum





πi [u(ci − v( i)) + βu(di)] − μ
X
i
πi (ci + di − yi),
where μ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint while πi
denotes the relative number of type i’s individuals. A type is here deﬁned by a certain
degree of myopia and a wage rate. Maximization of LFB yields
xi = x,
di = d,
 j <  k iﬀ wj <w k.
With these preferences the utilitarian solution implies that consumption levels (net of
labor disutility in period one) are equalized across types and periods and that the able
individuals work more than the unable. This ﬁrst-best allocation can be decentralized
by using two instruments. First, we need lump-sum transfers to redistribute from high
to low productivity individuals. In addition a “Pigouvian” (corrective) subsidy at rate
1−β0/β on the savings of the myopics is required to induce them to save the appropriate
amount. As an alternative to the savings subsidy, one can also use a pension scheme to
5force myopic individuals to save. Either way, in a full information setting, there is no
conﬂict between paternalism and redistribution. The two objectives are addressed by
separate instruments. Any redistributive impact of corrective policies can be neutralized
through lump-sum transfers.
2.2 Optimal linear pension scheme
We now leave the world of ﬁrst-best and introduce our linear pension scheme that
is partially ﬂat and partially earnings-related.12 We assume that wage diﬀerences are
private knowledge, as is degree of myopia. We introduce social security with two para-
meters, a proportional tax rate τ for youth, and a degree of redistribution 1−α for old
age beneﬁts. Some agents are “far-sighted”, j = F, and some are “myopic”, j = M.
The former have intertemporal discount factor β,a n dt h el a t t e rβ0 <β . In this section,
we assume the myopic agents have β0 =0 . That is to say, in youth they give no thought
to their own coming old age. As to the far-sighted, we set β =1for simplicity. Using a
continuous version of w,p e n s i o nb e n e ﬁts of an individual with wage w is:
p(w)=ταw + τ(1 − α)Ew ,
where α is often called the “Bismarckian factor”. Here and throughout the paper the
notation Ez,w h e r ez is any function of w, is used for its average value. In particular,
Ew  denotes average earnings. We have two polar cases depending on the value of α.
For α =0we have a ﬂat pension equal to p = τEw ; (Beveridgean system). And for
α =1 ,w eh a v eac o n t r i b u t i v ep e n s i o nw i t hb e n e ﬁt p = τw  (Bismarckian system).
When the liquidity constraint does not bind, we have13
v0( F)=[ 1− τ(1 − α)]w
v0( M)=( 1− τ)w
Not surprisingly there is no distortion for the far-sighted with a fully contributory system
(α =1 ) . The labor choice of the myopic is distorted regardless of the value of α.T h e s e
12This section follows Cremer et al. (2008b). See also Findley and Caliendo (2009).
13Expressions are more complicated when the liquidity constraint is binding. Consequently, labor
supply depends on w, τ and α for all rational individuals, and also on Ew  (this Beveridgean component
of the pension beneﬁts) for those rational agents who are liquidity constrained. See Cremer et al. (2007)
for a more detailed discussion.
6expression determine  F and  M as function of the wage, w, and the parameters of the
pension system, τ and, in the case of  F, α.
Turning to the government’s problem, we write its Lagrangian expression (where LP
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Recall that labor supply and savings are functions of wage and of the parameters
of the pension system and that these functions are diﬀerent for the myopic and the far
sighted individuals. In the tax formula, the ﬁrst term of both the numerator and the
denominator are the standard equity and eﬃciency terms in optimal linear taxation.
They vanish if α =1 . The second term in the numerator reﬂects the cost of not being
able to fully equalize marginal utilities between the two periods.14 The second term in
the denominator reﬂects the fact that the distortion for the myopic is independent of
α, whereas for the far-sighted it vanishes when α =1 . The second expression concerns
t h eo p t i m a lv a l u eo fα.
Two questions come to mind at this point: how does the generosity of the system
and its redistributive character change with the proportion of myopics? One expects
more generosity (forced saving concerns not only the poor but also the myopics) and
less redistribution (part of forced saving concerns the rich myopics). Unfortunately,
14This term vanished for the farsighted whose liquidity constraint is not binding.
7πF ατ τ ∗
0.0000 0.000 0.250 0.250
0.1000 0.066 0.247 0.247
0.2000 0.122 0.245 0.243
0.4000 0.209 0.242 0.233
0.6000 0.272 0.239 0.220
0.7000 0.298 0.238 0.211
0.9000 0.342 0.236 0.209
0.910 0.344 0.236 0.179
0.930 0.347 0.236 0.174
0.960 0.353 0.236 0.165
0.990 0.358 0.235 0.155
0.999 0.360 0.235 0.151
0.9999 0.360 0.235 0.151
1.0 - - 0.151
Table 1: Optimal linear pension scheme as a function of the proportion of rational
individuals. No liquidity constraint. We denote τ∗ the optimal tax rate for α =0 .
the above formulas are not helpful to answer these questions. Hence we resort to some
numerical simulations with individual utility:
u =l o g
¡
c −  2/2
¢
+l o gd
and with a positively skewed Beta (2,4) distribution for the wages with support (1,4).
We continue to assume that βM =0and βF =1 . Table 1 concerns the case without
liquidity constraint. It gives the optimal values of both α and τ for diﬀerent proportions
o fm y o p i c s .T h el a s tc o l u m ng i v e st h eo p t i m a lv a l u eo fτ when α =0 , that is when the
pension system is purely Beveridgean. Starting with the extreme values, we see that
with only myopics, the pension system is Beveridgean and the tax rate equal to .25. We
observe that α increases, while τ decreases with the proportion of far-sighted individuals.
Going back to the two questions raised above, we can say that both the generosity and
the redistributiveness increase with the proportion of myopics. When the pension system
is constrained to be purely Beveridgean, τ decreases when πF increases. Table 2 reports
the results when savings is constrained to be non negative for the far-sighted and zero
for the myopics. The generosity of the system continues to decrease with πF.H o w e v e r ,
the pattern of results pertaining to α is now more complex. We notice ﬁr s tt h a tw i t h
8πF ατ τ ∗
0.0000 0.000 0.250 0.250
0.1000 0.072 0.246 0.245
0.2000 0.131 0.243 0.240
0.4000 0.220 0.236 0.228
0.6000 0.277 0.230 0.213
0.7000 0.295 0.225 0.203
0.9000 0.290 0.209 0.191
0.9900 0.106 0.166 0.151
0.9990 -0.184 0.127 0.148
0.9999 -0.346 0.111 0.147
1.0000 -1.360 0.064 0.147
Table 2: Optimal linear pension scheme as a function of the proportion of far-sighted
individuals. Liquidity constraint is imposed.
only far-sighted, α is negative, that is the pension system is means-tested, but not very
generous (τ =0 .06). Second, α is no longer a monotonic function of the proportion
of far-sighted. As πF increases, α increases and then decreases. The property that
generosity and the redistributiveness increase with the proportion of myopics thus has
to be qualiﬁed here and applies only when πF is in the range of [0,0.8].
2.3 Voting over type and generosity of pension system
In the previous section we have dealt with myopic individuals that could have been naive
or sophisticated. It was not possible to sort them out, as there were no commitment
device available that could have been used by the sophisticated and not by the naive.
Voting provides an opportunity for the sophisticated myopics to vote for the policy
parameters, namely the tax rate and the Bismarckian factor, by using their “true”,
long run, preferences while anticipating that they will make some decisions in a myopic
way. In other words, at the moment they vote, they try to determine the social security
system that will act as a commitment device. This is an interesting feature: for a short
instant, behind a kind of veil of ignorance, or rather the walls of the voting booth myopic
individuals are in a state of grace.15
15This section follows Cremer et al. (2007).
9The term “myopic” is admittedly somewhat misleading for sophisticated myopics.
The problem with these individuals is not so much their short-sightedness, but their
lack of self-control when savings, labor and consumption decisions are made. At the
voting stage these individuals eﬀectively have a rather sophisticated behavior in that
they anticipate their future (mis)behavior. A possible justiﬁcation for this combination
of sophisticated and myopic behavior is the fact that voting is a low frequency event
which can serve as a commitment mechanism while savings decisions are made in a
continuous (and often reversible way) which creates more opportunities to breach one’s
original plans. Cremer et al. (2007) study this problem using the above quasi linear
speciﬁcation for the ﬁrst period utility. In their model, people vote sequentially. They
ﬁrst vote on whether the pension system is Bismarckian or Beveridgean. Intermediate
solutions are not considered for reasons of simplicity. They then vote on the tax rate.
The following conclusions are reached. First, whereas with homogeneous societies (only
myopic or only rational) the majority always votes for a Beveridgean pension system,
with mixed societies, a Bismarckian system can turn out to be desirable. Second, the tax
rate does not always increase with the proportion of myopic individuals, which somehow
contradicts the results obtained in the normative cases. Third, there are cases which
result into a “ends against the middle” solution.
To illustrate these points Table 3 presents an example provided by Cremer et al.
(2007). This example gives the voting equilibrium as a function of the proportion of
myopics when the utility is logarithmic and the ability has a Beta density function. As
the proportion of myopics increases the support of myopics for Beveridge increases and
that of the far-sighted decreases.
Up to now we have assumed that individuals were either myopic or far-sighted and
the myopics were sophisticated. Sophisticated agents are opposed to naïve ones, who
do not see the problem and perceive themselves as time consistent agents. If we had
naïve agents in the voting game just sketched, they would vote against any forced
saving. This point is made by Bassi (2008). Bassi (2008) develops a political economy
model, in which the size of the social security system and the degree of redistribution
are chosen by direct majority voting. He shows that a winning coalition of hyperbolic
10Prop of myopics Support for Bev by myopics by far-sighted Bev/Bis Tax
0 0.520 Bev 0.055
0.02 0.213 0.509 Bev 0.069
0.05 0.508 0.497 Bis 0.250
0.25 0.536 0.451 Bis 0.250
0.50 0.539 0.442 Bis 0.250
1.00 0.539 Bev 0.250
Table 3: Voting equilibrium as a function of the proportion of myopics
individuals is able to determine both the generosity and the degree of redistribution of
the PAYGO system. In particular, his model explains why low level of redistribution
are often associated with generous pension programs.
The distinction between sophisticated and naive myopic agents is particularly useful
in three (or more) period-models with both saving and retirement decision. If retirement
age is to be chosen in the second period its choice can be used as a commitment device
to achieve the right level of saving for consumption in the third period. Frogneux (2009)
builds a model in which the agents vote on the tax rate and on the generosity of the
early retirement scheme. He shows that the young generation may favor setting up a
PAYGO pension system even if it is a dominated saving device just because it increases
the cost of early retirement and can be a way to constraint future retirement choice if
these contributions are lost in case of early retirement. If the young do not perceive the
self-control problem (i.e., if they are naive), such a result would not emerge.
3 Nonlinear pension schemes
In the previous section, we have assumed a linear scheme that rested on gross earnings.
For obvious reasons, a non linear scheme based on the same variable should be preferred
particularly if it can be supplemented by some taxation of savings. We now turn to such
as c h e m e 16. To keep the analysis simple we consider a society consisting of four types
of individuals as represented on Figure 1. Type-1 and type-3 individuals are the far-
sighted with low and high ability respectively. Type-2 (low ability) and type-4 (high
16This section follows Cremer et al. (2009). See also Tenhunen and Tuomala (2010)
11ability) individuals on the other hand are myopic. Total population size is normalized
at one and the proportion of type i =1 ,...,4 individuals is denoted by πi.I n t h e
analytical second-best part we provide general expressions but for their interpretation
we concentrate on a three type setting. The fully-ﬂedged four type case is then solved
in numerical examples.
True preferences are given by
U(ci,d i,l i)=u(ci)+βu(di) − v( i),
whereas savings and labor supply are chosen according to
Ui(ci,d i,l i)=u(ci)+βiu(di) − v( i).
For myopic individuals we have βi = β0, while βi = β>β 0 holds for the far-sighted.
Our non linear tax/pension system is denoted by T(yi,s i) and p(yi,s i) where both





Ts(yi,s i) − ps(yi,s i)
1+Ts(yi,s i)
, (3)
which represent the implicit marginal tax (or subsidy) on savings implied by the tax
and pension schemes. When Θi < (>)0 type-i individual faces a marginal subsidy (tax)
on savings. Observe that
u0(ci)
u0(di)
= βi(1 − Θi)
The interpretation of Θi depends on implementation (private savings vs pensions
system). For example when di’s are fully controlled by the pension system, Θi <
0 means that the system implies forced saving for type i. We now characterize the
optimal allocations (ci,d i,y i) subject to the relevant self-selection constraints that rely
on observable variables. With two dimensions we cannot avoid a complex pattern of
binding IC constraints but ﬁrst let us look at the ﬁrst-best solutions which is given by
c1 = c2 = c3 = c4,
d1 = d2 = d3 = d4,




L w H w w
3 1
4 2
Figure 1: Types of individuals
13This solution is of course not incentive compatible. This leads us to the second-best
problem in the case where individual productivities and preferences are not publicly
observable. The question we want to explore is that of a possible conﬂict between
corrective subsidy and redistribution.
As announced, we assume π2 =0 . In other words there are no myopic poor. In this
3-type case only “downward” constraints are binding. Namely,
1. λ34 > 0, λ41 > 0,a n dλ31 > 0,w h i l eλij =0f o ra l lo t h e rc o n s t r a i n t s ,
2. λ34 > 0 and λ41 > 0,w h i l eλij =0f o ra l lo t h e rc o n s t r a i n t s . 17
When the binding incentive constraints are those associated with the Lagrange mul-
tipliers λ34, λ41, and λ31, one can easily check (by combining the three constraints) that
d4 = d1. In the other case, when the binding incentive constraints are associated with
λ34 and λ41, we have d1 <d 4. In both cases combining the ﬁrst-order conditions with
Equation 3 and simplifying yields the following expressions:
















π1 − λ31 − λ41
. (6)
Equation 4 means that high-ability far-sighted individuals face no distortion on their
savings (they face a zero marginal tax rate). Equation 6 implies Θ1 < 0, so that savings
of low-ability (far-sighted) individuals are subsidized. This is not due to paternalism
but to incentive considerations (to relax an otherwise binding incentive constraint).
Subsidizing saving by type-1 individuals makes their consumption bundle less attractive
to type-4 individuals (who have a lower βi). These are all rather standard results.
T u r n i n gt ot h em y o p i c( t y p e - 4), the analysis of Θ becomes much more interesting.
Intuitively, one might expect Θ4 < 0, so that the system forces these individuals to save.
Interestingly, however, it turn out that Θ4 can be positive as well as negative, because
17Recall that in a Kuhn-Tucker problem λij > 0 means that the associated constraint is binding. See
on this Cremer et al (2001, 2003)
14the two terms in Equation 5 are of opposite sign. The optimal tax term is positive
because the relevant binding incentive constr a i n tg o e sf r o mt y pe - 3t ot y pe - 4 ,a n dw eh a v e
β3 = β>β 4 = β0. The paternalistic term, on the other hand, is negative (as discussed
above). Which case occurs depends on the sign of π4 − λ34;w h e nπ4 − λ34 > (<)0, Θ4
is negative (positive). We thus have a conﬂict between paternalistic and redistributive
considerations. Intuitively, correcting for myopia (through forced savings) beneﬁts the
rich myopic at the expense of the poor far-sighted.
To get more insight we now turn to some numerical results. These are obtained from
an example with a utility function:




di − ( i)2,
and myopic individuals with β0 =0 .2 or β0 =0 .8. Wages rates are wL =4(proportion
0.6)a n dwH =8 . The relative share of myopics is given by πM.
From the ﬁgure given below it appears that social welfare decreases with πM (except
in the ﬁrst-best where it is constant). The gap between the second-best and laissez-faire
increases with πM. Table 3 shows how the welfare of the far-sighted is aﬀected by
the presence of myopic individuals. It appears that the poor workers are penalized by
the presence of shortsighted individuals. Myopia implies a less redistributive tax and
pension system. This can be contrasted with the linear pension case in which both the
generosity of the pension system and its redistributiveness increases with the number
of myopics.
4 Habit formation and sin goods
In the previous sections, myopia mainly concerned retirement saving. Because of myopia
individuals are not saving enough. If there exists no private or social commitment device
they reach retirement without suﬃcient resources. We now consider two instance in
which those individuals can at least in part compensate for too little saving. The ﬁrst
instance is when their retirement age is endogenous and they have thus the possibility
to extend their career or even to unretire to meet some unexpected needs. Those
needs are not always foreseen and come from habit formation. The second instance
15Figure 2: Welfare as a function of the proportion of myopic individuals
β0 =0 .2 β0 =0 .8
πM Welfare e U3 − e U1 Welfare e U3 − e U1
0,02 2,4035 0,3296 2,4035 0,3296
0,05 2,4021 0,3310 2,4021 0,3310
0,10 2,3997 0,3332 2,3997 0,3418
0,20 2,3953 0,3374 2,3977 0,3906
0,50 2,3843 0,3482 2,3964 0,4220
0,70 2,3784 0,3922 2,3961 0,4281
0,90 2,3744 0,4648 2,3960 0,4316
0,95 2,3736 0,4790 2,3960 0,4323
0,98 2,3731 0,4870 2,3960 0,4326
Table 4: Welfare and utility gap in the second-best
16is when individuals consume some “sin goods” in the ﬁrst period not realizing that
they have detrimental eﬀects on their health in the second period. Fortunately when
they reach this second period they can alleviate some of the damage through additional
non anticipated health spending. In those two instances, government policy has to be
adjusted in an interesting way.
4.1 Habit formation and labor supply
Consider individuals who work the entirety of the ﬁrst period and just a fraction   of the
second. Their consumption of ﬁrst period has a stimulating eﬀect on their consumption
in second period but because of myopia they do not take that “habit formation” eﬀect
into account when saving.18 As a consequence, when they reach the second period of
their life these individuals are short of resources and to meet these unforeseen needs
they have to work longer than expected. Formally, their preferences are expressed as:
U (c,d, )=u(c)+v(d,c) − h( ),
where v(d,c) is the utility for second period consumption that depends on ﬁrst period
consumption, and   is second period labor supply (retirement age)19 We express the idea
of habit formation by positing vc < 0 and vdc > 0; namely previous period consumption
generates additional needs and reduces second period’s utility. As before we have myopic
and far-sighted individuals. Myopic individuals use v(d,0) in period 1; and we have to
distinguish  P from  , that is planned from actual age of retirement. As expected,
in the laissez-faire   is larger for myopics and this can explain the phenomenon of
“unretirement”. The ﬁrst-best is trivial and its decentralization requires a tax on c or
a subsidy on d. In contrast the second-best with linear taxes is complex as it implies
a tricky interaction between redistribution, revenue raising and corrective (Pigouvian)
considerations. Formally the model is similar to Sandmo (1975), except that it is much
more intricate.20 Unlike in Sandmo the principle of targeting does not hold. Introducing
diﬀerent wages along with diﬀerent degrees of myopia, we show that the optimal policy
18This subsection follows Cremer et al. (2010a).
19Note the diﬀerence with Diamond and Mirrlees (2000)
20See also Cremer et al (1998)
17is less redistributive than it would be without myopia. Another rather surprising ﬁnding
is that the consumption tax increases the welfare of both the myopic (Pigouvian eﬀect)
and far-sighted individuals (redistributive eﬀect). There are possible extensions to this
model. For example, there is the case of young workers who do overtime not realizing
that this will hurt their health and force them in early retirement for reasons of disability.
In the ﬁrst best overtime should be regulated but in a world with double heterogeneity
redistribution and myopia correction interfere.
4.2 Taxing sin goods and subsidizing health care
Sin goods are interesting when they involve the duality of self.21 B a s i c a l l yw h e nt h e y
consume the sin good individuals focus on instant gratiﬁcation and neglect the delayed
eﬀects of their sinful consumption on their health. Here too they welcome the pater-
nalistic intervention of a government that pursues two objectives: redistribution and
correcting for myopia. The individual utility function is simply:
Ui = u(ci)+ϕ(xi)+u(di)+βih(xi,e i),
where x is consumption of sin good (period 1) and h is health status in second period;
e is expenses on health care. Myopics use αi <β i. Once again interplay between
redistribution and corrective taxes (covariance and Pigouvian terms). It is interesting
to distinguish not only far-sighted and myopic individuals but also myopic individuals
that have a dual self (D) and "single self" individuals who happily never admit their
sin (S).
We denote the tax on the sin good by θi where i = D,S.T h e ﬁrst-best can be
decentralized with
θS T θD iﬀ hxe T 0.
In other words, if x and e are complements, hxe > 0, the sin tax is higher with persis-
tent error than with regret; a myopic individual of type D under-estimates consumption
of health care or alternatively he overestimates damage compared to an individual of
type S. Note that the above inequality can also be used to compare the case with and
21This subsection follows Cremer et al. (2010b).
18without corrective health treatment. In case of complementarity, the sin tax is higher
without such a correction being available than with it.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has surveyed some of the recent work devoted to the design of a social
security scheme in a setting where individuals diﬀer in both productivity and myopia.
It ﬁrst looked at the normative question of a government that acts paternalistically in
attributing to all individuals the same far-sighted time preferences. The main analytical
result we obtain is that as the number of myopic agents increases, the desirability of
social security (measured by the diﬀerence between social welfare with and without
social security) increases. Further in the linear case, as the number of myopics increases,
the system becomes more generous but also more redistributive at least for a not too
high proportion of far-sighted. The paper then turned to the choice of social security
by majority voting; the main conclusion is that whereas ﬂat rate pensions prevail in
societies with only myopics or far-sighted, in mixed society, part of the beneﬁts are
earnings-related or to put it another way, the pension scheme is less redistributive.
The basic lesson that emerges from the this literature is that the interplay between
redistribution and forced saving is both complex and interesting. In the absence of
myopia, the problem would be “straightforward”; without heterogeneity in wage, it
would be trivial (the ﬁrst-best can easily be achieved). Combining these two features
brings about an intricate interaction which yields some rather counterintuitive results.
To keep this survey focused on the interaction between redistribution and myopia
we have made several simplifying assumptions: (i) the wage and interest rates are given
(linear technology or small open economy), (ii) r = n, so that PAYGO and fully funding
are equivalent, (iii) individuals live just for two periods, (iv) the model is static, more
precisely it depicts a steady-state economy and, (v), the age of retirement is given.
These assumptions have lead us to neglect a number of existing contributions. For
instance Frogneux (2009) considers an endogenous retirement age within a hyperbolic
discounting setting àl aSalanié and Treich (2006). He shows that the impact of a
quasi-hyperbolic discount function on the retirement age is ap r i o r iindeterminate: a
19self-control eﬀect leads to early retirement while the discounting eﬀect leads to later
retirement. By restricting our model to two periods we also miss an interesting result
due to Imrohoroglu et al. (2003) and recently generalized by Caliendo (2009) according
to which in partial equilibrium, naive quasi-hyperbolic consumers who do not anticipate
their own time inconsistency cannot beneﬁt from a social security program with a neg-
ative net present value. This result is important and surprising given the conventional
wisdom that social security can be rationalized as a useful commitment device for hy-
perbolic discounters. What is the intuition of this result? The upshot is that a PAYGO
social security with n<rreduces life-cycle consumption in every period across the life
cycle.22 Our model is a two-period static model. For a dynamic analysis, see Fehr et
al. (2008) who resort to calibrated numerical simulations to show that with myopia
the eﬃciency cost of privatization is higher than without myopia23. See also Fehr and
Kindermann (2009) who compare the relative merits of standard social security and
individual retirement accounts when individuals are more or less myopic. All this work
is interesting but is not concerned by the double heterogeneity that is at the hart of this
survey.
Some extensions and variations have been presented in the second part. The ﬁrst
one deals with situations where labor disutility or preferences for consumption are sub-
ject to “habit formation”. Myopic individuals may not be aware of this relationship
(or discount the future in an inappropriate way) when they make their labor supply,
consumption and savings decisions. We show that the combination of habit formation
(present consumption creating additional consumption needs in the future) and myopia
may explain why some retirees are forced to postpone retirement. This in turn may
call for government intervention. Another variation deals with the issues of “sin taxes”
and the subsidization of health care for the elderly. We consider a sin good that brings
pleasure but has a detrimental eﬀect on second period health. Myopic individuals tend
to underestimate this eﬀect. In the second period, individuals can devote part of their
saving to improve their health status and thus compensate for the damage caused by
22See also on this Andersen and Bhattacharya (2010).
23See also Bucciol (2008).
20their sinful consumption. We study the optimal linear taxes on sin good consumption,
saving and health care expenditures for a paternalistic social planner.
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